La invasión rusa de Ucrania de 2022. Vol. 9

Cantoná escribió:

https://twitter.com/elEconomistaes/status/1509071886424195077?t=W3yzOzhB8SQDoU0gaB6n8w&s=19

¿Cómo es ese dicho de "nos mean y..."?

loaded escribió:Interesante e inquietante reflexión (en inglés) acerca de que quizá a Putin no le hayan salido tan mal los cálculos.

The conventional wisdom is that Vladimir Putin catastrophically miscalculated.

He thought Russian-speaking Ukrainians would welcome his troops. They didn’t. He thought he’d swiftly depose Volodymyr Zelensky’s government. He hasn’t. He thought he’d divide NATO. He’s united it. He thought he had sanction-proofed his economy. He’s wrecked it. He thought the Chinese would help him out. They’re hedging their bets. He thought his modernized military would make mincemeat of Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainians are making mincemeat of his, at least on some fronts.

Putin’s miscalculations raise questions about his strategic judgment and mental state. Who, if anyone, is advising him? Has he lost contact with reality? Is he physically unwell? Mentally? Condoleezza Rice warns: “He’s not in control of his emotions. Something is wrong.” Russia’s sieges of Mariupol and Kharkiv — two heavily Russian-speaking cities that Putin claims to be “liberating” from Ukrainian oppression — resemble what the Nazis did to Warsaw, and what Putin himself did to Grozny.

Several analysts have compared Putin to a cornered rat, more dangerous now that he’s no longer in control of events. They want to give him a safe way out of the predicament he allegedly created for himself. Hence the almost universal scorn poured on Joe Biden for saying in Poland, “For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power.”

The conventional wisdom is entirely plausible. It has the benefit of vindicating the West’s strategy of supporting Ukraine defensively. And it tends toward the conclusion that the best outcome is one in which Putin finds some face-saving exit: additional Ukrainian territory, a Ukrainian pledge of neutrality, a lifting of some of the sanctions.

But what if the conventional wisdom is wrong? What if the West is only playing into Putin’s hands once again?

The possibility is suggested in a powerful reminiscence from The Times’s Carlotta Gall of her experience covering Russia’s siege of Grozny, during the first Chechen war in the mid-1990s. In the early phases of the war, motivated Chechen fighters wiped out a Russian armored brigade, stunning Moscow. The Russians regrouped and wiped out Grozny from afar, using artillery and air power.

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Russia’s operating from the same playbook today. When Western military analysts argue that Putin can’t win militarily in Ukraine, what they really mean is that he can’t win clean. Since when has Putin ever played clean?

“There is a whole next stage to the Putin playbook, which is well known to the Chechens,” Gall writes. “As Russian troops gained control on the ground in Chechnya, they crushed any further dissent with arrests and filtration camps and by turning and empowering local protégés and collaborators.”

Suppose for a moment that Putin never intended to conquer all of Ukraine: that, from the beginning, his real targets were the energy riches of Ukraine’s east, which contain Europe’s second-largest known reserves of natural gas (after Norway’s).

Combine that with Russia’s previous territorial seizures in Crimea (which has huge offshore energy fields) and the eastern provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk (which contain part of an enormous shale-gas field), as well as Putin’s bid to control most or all of Ukraine’s coastline, and the shape of Putin’s ambitions become clear. He’s less interested in reuniting the Russian-speaking world than he is in securing Russia’s energy dominance.

“Under the guise of an invasion, Putin is executing an enormous heist,” said Canadian energy expert David Knight Legg. As for what’s left of a mostly landlocked Ukraine, it will likely become a welfare case for the West, which will help pick up the tab for resettling Ukraine’s refugees to new homes outside of Russian control. In time, a Viktor Orban-like figure could take Ukraine’s presidency, imitating the strongman-style of politics that Putin prefers in his neighbors.

If this analysis is right, then Putin doesn’t seem like the miscalculating loser his critics make him out to be.

It also makes sense of his strategy of targeting civilians. More than simply a way of compensating for the incompetence of Russian troops, the mass killing of civilians puts immense pressure on Zelensky to agree to the very things Putin has demanded all along: territorial concessions and Ukrainian neutrality. The West will also look for any opportunity to de-escalate, especially as we convince ourselves that a mentally unstable Putin is prepared to use nuclear weapons.

Within Russia, the war has already served Putin’s political purposes. Many in the professional middle class — the people most sympathetic to dissidents like Aleksei Navalny — have gone into self-imposed exile. The remnants of a free press have been shuttered, probably for good. To the extent that Russia’s military has embarrassed itself, it is more likely to lead to a well-aimed purge from above than a broad revolution from below. Russia’s new energy riches could eventually help it shake loose the grip of sanctions.

This alternative analysis of Putin’s performance could be wrong. Then again, in war, politics and life, it’s always wiser to treat your adversary as a canny fox, not a crazy fool.

loaded escribió:Interesante e inquietante reflexión (en inglés) acerca de que quizá a Putin no le hayan salido tan mal los cálculos.

The conventional wisdom is that Vladimir Putin catastrophically miscalculated.

He thought Russian-speaking Ukrainians would welcome his troops. They didn’t. He thought he’d swiftly depose Volodymyr Zelensky’s government. He hasn’t. He thought he’d divide NATO. He’s united it. He thought he had sanction-proofed his economy. He’s wrecked it. He thought the Chinese would help him out. They’re hedging their bets. He thought his modernized military would make mincemeat of Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainians are making mincemeat of his, at least on some fronts.

Putin’s miscalculations raise questions about his strategic judgment and mental state. Who, if anyone, is advising him? Has he lost contact with reality? Is he physically unwell? Mentally? Condoleezza Rice warns: “He’s not in control of his emotions. Something is wrong.” Russia’s sieges of Mariupol and Kharkiv — two heavily Russian-speaking cities that Putin claims to be “liberating” from Ukrainian oppression — resemble what the Nazis did to Warsaw, and what Putin himself did to Grozny.

Several analysts have compared Putin to a cornered rat, more dangerous now that he’s no longer in control of events. They want to give him a safe way out of the predicament he allegedly created for himself. Hence the almost universal scorn poured on Joe Biden for saying in Poland, “For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power.”

The conventional wisdom is entirely plausible. It has the benefit of vindicating the West’s strategy of supporting Ukraine defensively. And it tends toward the conclusion that the best outcome is one in which Putin finds some face-saving exit: additional Ukrainian territory, a Ukrainian pledge of neutrality, a lifting of some of the sanctions.

But what if the conventional wisdom is wrong? What if the West is only playing into Putin’s hands once again?

The possibility is suggested in a powerful reminiscence from The Times’s Carlotta Gall of her experience covering Russia’s siege of Grozny, during the first Chechen war in the mid-1990s. In the early phases of the war, motivated Chechen fighters wiped out a Russian armored brigade, stunning Moscow. The Russians regrouped and wiped out Grozny from afar, using artillery and air power.

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Russia’s operating from the same playbook today. When Western military analysts argue that Putin can’t win militarily in Ukraine, what they really mean is that he can’t win clean. Since when has Putin ever played clean?

“There is a whole next stage to the Putin playbook, which is well known to the Chechens,” Gall writes. “As Russian troops gained control on the ground in Chechnya, they crushed any further dissent with arrests and filtration camps and by turning and empowering local protégés and collaborators.”

Suppose for a moment that Putin never intended to conquer all of Ukraine: that, from the beginning, his real targets were the energy riches of Ukraine’s east, which contain Europe’s second-largest known reserves of natural gas (after Norway’s).

Combine that with Russia’s previous territorial seizures in Crimea (which has huge offshore energy fields) and the eastern provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk (which contain part of an enormous shale-gas field), as well as Putin’s bid to control most or all of Ukraine’s coastline, and the shape of Putin’s ambitions become clear. He’s less interested in reuniting the Russian-speaking world than he is in securing Russia’s energy dominance.

“Under the guise of an invasion, Putin is executing an enormous heist,” said Canadian energy expert David Knight Legg. As for what’s left of a mostly landlocked Ukraine, it will likely become a welfare case for the West, which will help pick up the tab for resettling Ukraine’s refugees to new homes outside of Russian control. In time, a Viktor Orban-like figure could take Ukraine’s presidency, imitating the strongman-style of politics that Putin prefers in his neighbors.

If this analysis is right, then Putin doesn’t seem like the miscalculating loser his critics make him out to be.

It also makes sense of his strategy of targeting civilians. More than simply a way of compensating for the incompetence of Russian troops, the mass killing of civilians puts immense pressure on Zelensky to agree to the very things Putin has demanded all along: territorial concessions and Ukrainian neutrality. The West will also look for any opportunity to de-escalate, especially as we convince ourselves that a mentally unstable Putin is prepared to use nuclear weapons.

Within Russia, the war has already served Putin’s political purposes. Many in the professional middle class — the people most sympathetic to dissidents like Aleksei Navalny — have gone into self-imposed exile. The remnants of a free press have been shuttered, probably for good. To the extent that Russia’s military has embarrassed itself, it is more likely to lead to a well-aimed purge from above than a broad revolution from below. Russia’s new energy riches could eventually help it shake loose the grip of sanctions.

This alternative analysis of Putin’s performance could be wrong. Then again, in war, politics and life, it’s always wiser to treat your adversary as a canny fox, not a crazy fool.

Spasic escribió:

loaded escribió:Interesante e inquietante reflexión (en inglés) acerca de que quizá a Putin no le hayan salido tan mal los cálculos.

The conventional wisdom is that Vladimir Putin catastrophically miscalculated.

He thought Russian-speaking Ukrainians would welcome his troops. They didn’t. He thought he’d swiftly depose Volodymyr Zelensky’s government. He hasn’t. He thought he’d divide NATO. He’s united it. He thought he had sanction-proofed his economy. He’s wrecked it. He thought the Chinese would help him out. They’re hedging their bets. He thought his modernized military would make mincemeat of Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainians are making mincemeat of his, at least on some fronts.

Putin’s miscalculations raise questions about his strategic judgment and mental state. Who, if anyone, is advising him? Has he lost contact with reality? Is he physically unwell? Mentally? Condoleezza Rice warns: “He’s not in control of his emotions. Something is wrong.” Russia’s sieges of Mariupol and Kharkiv — two heavily Russian-speaking cities that Putin claims to be “liberating” from Ukrainian oppression — resemble what the Nazis did to Warsaw, and what Putin himself did to Grozny.

Several analysts have compared Putin to a cornered rat, more dangerous now that he’s no longer in control of events. They want to give him a safe way out of the predicament he allegedly created for himself. Hence the almost universal scorn poured on Joe Biden for saying in Poland, “For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power.”

The conventional wisdom is entirely plausible. It has the benefit of vindicating the West’s strategy of supporting Ukraine defensively. And it tends toward the conclusion that the best outcome is one in which Putin finds some face-saving exit: additional Ukrainian territory, a Ukrainian pledge of neutrality, a lifting of some of the sanctions.

But what if the conventional wisdom is wrong? What if the West is only playing into Putin’s hands once again?

The possibility is suggested in a powerful reminiscence from The Times’s Carlotta Gall of her experience covering Russia’s siege of Grozny, during the first Chechen war in the mid-1990s. In the early phases of the war, motivated Chechen fighters wiped out a Russian armored brigade, stunning Moscow. The Russians regrouped and wiped out Grozny from afar, using artillery and air power.

Did you know you can share 10 gift articles a month, even with nonsubscribers?
Share this article.
Russia’s operating from the same playbook today. When Western military analysts argue that Putin can’t win militarily in Ukraine, what they really mean is that he can’t win clean. Since when has Putin ever played clean?

“There is a whole next stage to the Putin playbook, which is well known to the Chechens,” Gall writes. “As Russian troops gained control on the ground in Chechnya, they crushed any further dissent with arrests and filtration camps and by turning and empowering local protégés and collaborators.”

Suppose for a moment that Putin never intended to conquer all of Ukraine: that, from the beginning, his real targets were the energy riches of Ukraine’s east, which contain Europe’s second-largest known reserves of natural gas (after Norway’s).

Combine that with Russia’s previous territorial seizures in Crimea (which has huge offshore energy fields) and the eastern provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk (which contain part of an enormous shale-gas field), as well as Putin’s bid to control most or all of Ukraine’s coastline, and the shape of Putin’s ambitions become clear. He’s less interested in reuniting the Russian-speaking world than he is in securing Russia’s energy dominance.

“Under the guise of an invasion, Putin is executing an enormous heist,” said Canadian energy expert David Knight Legg. As for what’s left of a mostly landlocked Ukraine, it will likely become a welfare case for the West, which will help pick up the tab for resettling Ukraine’s refugees to new homes outside of Russian control. In time, a Viktor Orban-like figure could take Ukraine’s presidency, imitating the strongman-style of politics that Putin prefers in his neighbors.

If this analysis is right, then Putin doesn’t seem like the miscalculating loser his critics make him out to be.

It also makes sense of his strategy of targeting civilians. More than simply a way of compensating for the incompetence of Russian troops, the mass killing of civilians puts immense pressure on Zelensky to agree to the very things Putin has demanded all along: territorial concessions and Ukrainian neutrality. The West will also look for any opportunity to de-escalate, especially as we convince ourselves that a mentally unstable Putin is prepared to use nuclear weapons.

Within Russia, the war has already served Putin’s political purposes. Many in the professional middle class — the people most sympathetic to dissidents like Aleksei Navalny — have gone into self-imposed exile. The remnants of a free press have been shuttered, probably for good. To the extent that Russia’s military has embarrassed itself, it is more likely to lead to a well-aimed purge from above than a broad revolution from below. Russia’s new energy riches could eventually help it shake loose the grip of sanctions.

This alternative analysis of Putin’s performance could be wrong. Then again, in war, politics and life, it’s always wiser to treat your adversary as a canny fox, not a crazy fool.

Muy interesante, gracias.

Tiendo a ver más próxima a la realidad esta visión que la que predomina en Occidente, que bajo mi punto de vista es demasiado triunfalista y simplista.

Solo el tiempo dirá qué analistas estaban más cerca de la realidad que surja de este conflicto.

clichentero escribió:

Spasic escribió:

loaded escribió:Interesante e inquietante reflexión (en inglés) acerca de que quizá a Putin no le hayan salido tan mal los cálculos.

The conventional wisdom is that Vladimir Putin catastrophically miscalculated.

He thought Russian-speaking Ukrainians would welcome his troops. They didn’t. He thought he’d swiftly depose Volodymyr Zelensky’s government. He hasn’t. He thought he’d divide NATO. He’s united it. He thought he had sanction-proofed his economy. He’s wrecked it. He thought the Chinese would help him out. They’re hedging their bets. He thought his modernized military would make mincemeat of Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainians are making mincemeat of his, at least on some fronts.

Putin’s miscalculations raise questions about his strategic judgment and mental state. Who, if anyone, is advising him? Has he lost contact with reality? Is he physically unwell? Mentally? Condoleezza Rice warns: “He’s not in control of his emotions. Something is wrong.” Russia’s sieges of Mariupol and Kharkiv — two heavily Russian-speaking cities that Putin claims to be “liberating” from Ukrainian oppression — resemble what the Nazis did to Warsaw, and what Putin himself did to Grozny.

Several analysts have compared Putin to a cornered rat, more dangerous now that he’s no longer in control of events. They want to give him a safe way out of the predicament he allegedly created for himself. Hence the almost universal scorn poured on Joe Biden for saying in Poland, “For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power.”

The conventional wisdom is entirely plausible. It has the benefit of vindicating the West’s strategy of supporting Ukraine defensively. And it tends toward the conclusion that the best outcome is one in which Putin finds some face-saving exit: additional Ukrainian territory, a Ukrainian pledge of neutrality, a lifting of some of the sanctions.

But what if the conventional wisdom is wrong? What if the West is only playing into Putin’s hands once again?

The possibility is suggested in a powerful reminiscence from The Times’s Carlotta Gall of her experience covering Russia’s siege of Grozny, during the first Chechen war in the mid-1990s. In the early phases of the war, motivated Chechen fighters wiped out a Russian armored brigade, stunning Moscow. The Russians regrouped and wiped out Grozny from afar, using artillery and air power.

Did you know you can share 10 gift articles a month, even with nonsubscribers?
Share this article.
Russia’s operating from the same playbook today. When Western military analysts argue that Putin can’t win militarily in Ukraine, what they really mean is that he can’t win clean. Since when has Putin ever played clean?

“There is a whole next stage to the Putin playbook, which is well known to the Chechens,” Gall writes. “As Russian troops gained control on the ground in Chechnya, they crushed any further dissent with arrests and filtration camps and by turning and empowering local protégés and collaborators.”

Suppose for a moment that Putin never intended to conquer all of Ukraine: that, from the beginning, his real targets were the energy riches of Ukraine’s east, which contain Europe’s second-largest known reserves of natural gas (after Norway’s).

Combine that with Russia’s previous territorial seizures in Crimea (which has huge offshore energy fields) and the eastern provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk (which contain part of an enormous shale-gas field), as well as Putin’s bid to control most or all of Ukraine’s coastline, and the shape of Putin’s ambitions become clear. He’s less interested in reuniting the Russian-speaking world than he is in securing Russia’s energy dominance.

“Under the guise of an invasion, Putin is executing an enormous heist,” said Canadian energy expert David Knight Legg. As for what’s left of a mostly landlocked Ukraine, it will likely become a welfare case for the West, which will help pick up the tab for resettling Ukraine’s refugees to new homes outside of Russian control. In time, a Viktor Orban-like figure could take Ukraine’s presidency, imitating the strongman-style of politics that Putin prefers in his neighbors.

If this analysis is right, then Putin doesn’t seem like the miscalculating loser his critics make him out to be.

It also makes sense of his strategy of targeting civilians. More than simply a way of compensating for the incompetence of Russian troops, the mass killing of civilians puts immense pressure on Zelensky to agree to the very things Putin has demanded all along: territorial concessions and Ukrainian neutrality. The West will also look for any opportunity to de-escalate, especially as we convince ourselves that a mentally unstable Putin is prepared to use nuclear weapons.

Within Russia, the war has already served Putin’s political purposes. Many in the professional middle class — the people most sympathetic to dissidents like Aleksei Navalny — have gone into self-imposed exile. The remnants of a free press have been shuttered, probably for good. To the extent that Russia’s military has embarrassed itself, it is more likely to lead to a well-aimed purge from above than a broad revolution from below. Russia’s new energy riches could eventually help it shake loose the grip of sanctions.

This alternative analysis of Putin’s performance could be wrong. Then again, in war, politics and life, it’s always wiser to treat your adversary as a canny fox, not a crazy fool.

Muy interesante, gracias.

Tiendo a ver más próxima a la realidad esta visión que la que predomina en Occidente, que bajo mi punto de vista es demasiado triunfalista y simplista.

Solo el tiempo dirá qué analistas estaban más cerca de la realidad que surja de este conflicto.

    Totalmente de acuerdo.

Mk2 escribió:

clichentero escribió:

Spasic escribió:

loaded escribió:Interesante e inquietante reflexión (en inglés) acerca de que quizá a Putin no le hayan salido tan mal los cálculos.

The conventional wisdom is that Vladimir Putin catastrophically miscalculated.

He thought Russian-speaking Ukrainians would welcome his troops. They didn’t. He thought he’d swiftly depose Volodymyr Zelensky’s government. He hasn’t. He thought he’d divide NATO. He’s united it. He thought he had sanction-proofed his economy. He’s wrecked it. He thought the Chinese would help him out. They’re hedging their bets. He thought his modernized military would make mincemeat of Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainians are making mincemeat of his, at least on some fronts.

Putin’s miscalculations raise questions about his strategic judgment and mental state. Who, if anyone, is advising him? Has he lost contact with reality? Is he physically unwell? Mentally? Condoleezza Rice warns: “He’s not in control of his emotions. Something is wrong.” Russia’s sieges of Mariupol and Kharkiv — two heavily Russian-speaking cities that Putin claims to be “liberating” from Ukrainian oppression — resemble what the Nazis did to Warsaw, and what Putin himself did to Grozny.

Several analysts have compared Putin to a cornered rat, more dangerous now that he’s no longer in control of events. They want to give him a safe way out of the predicament he allegedly created for himself. Hence the almost universal scorn poured on Joe Biden for saying in Poland, “For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power.”

The conventional wisdom is entirely plausible. It has the benefit of vindicating the West’s strategy of supporting Ukraine defensively. And it tends toward the conclusion that the best outcome is one in which Putin finds some face-saving exit: additional Ukrainian territory, a Ukrainian pledge of neutrality, a lifting of some of the sanctions.

But what if the conventional wisdom is wrong? What if the West is only playing into Putin’s hands once again?

The possibility is suggested in a powerful reminiscence from The Times’s Carlotta Gall of her experience covering Russia’s siege of Grozny, during the first Chechen war in the mid-1990s. In the early phases of the war, motivated Chechen fighters wiped out a Russian armored brigade, stunning Moscow. The Russians regrouped and wiped out Grozny from afar, using artillery and air power.

Did you know you can share 10 gift articles a month, even with nonsubscribers?
Share this article.
Russia’s operating from the same playbook today. When Western military analysts argue that Putin can’t win militarily in Ukraine, what they really mean is that he can’t win clean. Since when has Putin ever played clean?

“There is a whole next stage to the Putin playbook, which is well known to the Chechens,” Gall writes. “As Russian troops gained control on the ground in Chechnya, they crushed any further dissent with arrests and filtration camps and by turning and empowering local protégés and collaborators.”

Suppose for a moment that Putin never intended to conquer all of Ukraine: that, from the beginning, his real targets were the energy riches of Ukraine’s east, which contain Europe’s second-largest known reserves of natural gas (after Norway’s).

Combine that with Russia’s previous territorial seizures in Crimea (which has huge offshore energy fields) and the eastern provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk (which contain part of an enormous shale-gas field), as well as Putin’s bid to control most or all of Ukraine’s coastline, and the shape of Putin’s ambitions become clear. He’s less interested in reuniting the Russian-speaking world than he is in securing Russia’s energy dominance.

“Under the guise of an invasion, Putin is executing an enormous heist,” said Canadian energy expert David Knight Legg. As for what’s left of a mostly landlocked Ukraine, it will likely become a welfare case for the West, which will help pick up the tab for resettling Ukraine’s refugees to new homes outside of Russian control. In time, a Viktor Orban-like figure could take Ukraine’s presidency, imitating the strongman-style of politics that Putin prefers in his neighbors.

If this analysis is right, then Putin doesn’t seem like the miscalculating loser his critics make him out to be.

It also makes sense of his strategy of targeting civilians. More than simply a way of compensating for the incompetence of Russian troops, the mass killing of civilians puts immense pressure on Zelensky to agree to the very things Putin has demanded all along: territorial concessions and Ukrainian neutrality. The West will also look for any opportunity to de-escalate, especially as we convince ourselves that a mentally unstable Putin is prepared to use nuclear weapons.

Within Russia, the war has already served Putin’s political purposes. Many in the professional middle class — the people most sympathetic to dissidents like Aleksei Navalny — have gone into self-imposed exile. The remnants of a free press have been shuttered, probably for good. To the extent that Russia’s military has embarrassed itself, it is more likely to lead to a well-aimed purge from above than a broad revolution from below. Russia’s new energy riches could eventually help it shake loose the grip of sanctions.

This alternative analysis of Putin’s performance could be wrong. Then again, in war, politics and life, it’s always wiser to treat your adversary as a canny fox, not a crazy fool.

Muy interesante, gracias.

Tiendo a ver más próxima a la realidad esta visión que la que predomina en Occidente, que bajo mi punto de vista es demasiado triunfalista y simplista.

Solo el tiempo dirá qué analistas estaban más cerca de la realidad que surja de este conflicto.

    Totalmente de acuerdo.

No lo he leído, pero

Langarica escribió:Occidente malo. Caca.
Autoritarismo bueno.

Dumbie escribió:Quien saca el fusil para no usarlo es un bolchevique

https://twitter.com/MartinLthQueen/status/1508845224528949248?s=20&t=JsSSX2hLBz7UplzxhX8lMg

pantxo escribió:

Dumbie escribió:Quien saca el fusil para no usarlo es un bolchevique

https://twitter.com/MartinLthQueen/status/1508845224528949248?s=20&t=JsSSX2hLBz7UplzxhX8lMg

A esta gente les llegan las armas que mandamos desde Europa y USA. Cuando termine todo esto se va a quedar un continente precioso.

pantxo escribió:

Dumbie escribió:Quien saca el fusil para no usarlo es un bolchevique

https://twitter.com/MartinLthQueen/status/1508845224528949248?s=20&t=JsSSX2hLBz7UplzxhX8lMg

A esta gente les llegan las armas que mandamos desde Europa y USA. Cuando termine todo esto se va a quedar un continente precioso.

Ashra escribió:

pantxo escribió:

Dumbie escribió:Quien saca el fusil para no usarlo es un bolchevique

https://twitter.com/MartinLthQueen/status/1508845224528949248?s=20&t=JsSSX2hLBz7UplzxhX8lMg

A esta gente les llegan las armas que mandamos desde Europa y USA. Cuando termine todo esto se va a quedar un continente precioso.

Ostias

David Z. el 22 de marzo escribió:La bomba atómica si se saca es para usarla. El que no la usa es un parguela.

Zoetrope escribió:Cuando le aguantan los faroles parece que se echa para atrás.

https://www.elconfidencial.com/mundo/2022-03-30/ultima-hora-guerra-rusia-ucrania-retirada-tropas-reposicionamiento_3400124/

Steve Trumbo escribió:El video de los tios del eclipse lo suelo ver aproximadamente una vez cada tres meses.

pantxo escribió:

Dumbie escribió:Quien saca el fusil para no usarlo es un bolchevique

https://twitter.com/MartinLthQueen/status/1508845224528949248?s=20&t=JsSSX2hLBz7UplzxhX8lMg

A esta gente les llegan las armas que mandamos desde Europa y USA. Cuando termine todo esto se va a quedar un continente precioso.

pantxo escribió:Osea que son valencianos recien cerradita la Skaner.

pantxo escribió:Tremenda entrevista a Rafael Poch, el mejor programa que han hecho hasta la fecha. Desgrana los intereses rusos, chinos, americanos y europeos, habla de la desaparicion en Ucrania de "disidentes". Las posibles salidas de Putin y Zelenski. Cuenta quien amenazó a este con colgarlo de un arbol...
No os haré spoiler.

clichentero escribió:

Spasic escribió:

loaded escribió:Interesante e inquietante reflexión (en inglés) acerca de que quizá a Putin no le hayan salido tan mal los cálculos.

The conventional wisdom is that Vladimir Putin catastrophically miscalculated.

He thought Russian-speaking Ukrainians would welcome his troops. They didn’t. He thought he’d swiftly depose Volodymyr Zelensky’s government. He hasn’t. He thought he’d divide NATO. He’s united it. He thought he had sanction-proofed his economy. He’s wrecked it. He thought the Chinese would help him out. They’re hedging their bets. He thought his modernized military would make mincemeat of Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainians are making mincemeat of his, at least on some fronts.

Putin’s miscalculations raise questions about his strategic judgment and mental state. Who, if anyone, is advising him? Has he lost contact with reality? Is he physically unwell? Mentally? Condoleezza Rice warns: “He’s not in control of his emotions. Something is wrong.” Russia’s sieges of Mariupol and Kharkiv — two heavily Russian-speaking cities that Putin claims to be “liberating” from Ukrainian oppression — resemble what the Nazis did to Warsaw, and what Putin himself did to Grozny.

Several analysts have compared Putin to a cornered rat, more dangerous now that he’s no longer in control of events. They want to give him a safe way out of the predicament he allegedly created for himself. Hence the almost universal scorn poured on Joe Biden for saying in Poland, “For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power.”

The conventional wisdom is entirely plausible. It has the benefit of vindicating the West’s strategy of supporting Ukraine defensively. And it tends toward the conclusion that the best outcome is one in which Putin finds some face-saving exit: additional Ukrainian territory, a Ukrainian pledge of neutrality, a lifting of some of the sanctions.

But what if the conventional wisdom is wrong? What if the West is only playing into Putin’s hands once again?

The possibility is suggested in a powerful reminiscence from The Times’s Carlotta Gall of her experience covering Russia’s siege of Grozny, during the first Chechen war in the mid-1990s. In the early phases of the war, motivated Chechen fighters wiped out a Russian armored brigade, stunning Moscow. The Russians regrouped and wiped out Grozny from afar, using artillery and air power.

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Russia’s operating from the same playbook today. When Western military analysts argue that Putin can’t win militarily in Ukraine, what they really mean is that he can’t win clean. Since when has Putin ever played clean?

“There is a whole next stage to the Putin playbook, which is well known to the Chechens,” Gall writes. “As Russian troops gained control on the ground in Chechnya, they crushed any further dissent with arrests and filtration camps and by turning and empowering local protégés and collaborators.”

Suppose for a moment that Putin never intended to conquer all of Ukraine: that, from the beginning, his real targets were the energy riches of Ukraine’s east, which contain Europe’s second-largest known reserves of natural gas (after Norway’s).

Combine that with Russia’s previous territorial seizures in Crimea (which has huge offshore energy fields) and the eastern provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk (which contain part of an enormous shale-gas field), as well as Putin’s bid to control most or all of Ukraine’s coastline, and the shape of Putin’s ambitions become clear. He’s less interested in reuniting the Russian-speaking world than he is in securing Russia’s energy dominance.

“Under the guise of an invasion, Putin is executing an enormous heist,” said Canadian energy expert David Knight Legg. As for what’s left of a mostly landlocked Ukraine, it will likely become a welfare case for the West, which will help pick up the tab for resettling Ukraine’s refugees to new homes outside of Russian control. In time, a Viktor Orban-like figure could take Ukraine’s presidency, imitating the strongman-style of politics that Putin prefers in his neighbors.

If this analysis is right, then Putin doesn’t seem like the miscalculating loser his critics make him out to be.

It also makes sense of his strategy of targeting civilians. More than simply a way of compensating for the incompetence of Russian troops, the mass killing of civilians puts immense pressure on Zelensky to agree to the very things Putin has demanded all along: territorial concessions and Ukrainian neutrality. The West will also look for any opportunity to de-escalate, especially as we convince ourselves that a mentally unstable Putin is prepared to use nuclear weapons.

Within Russia, the war has already served Putin’s political purposes. Many in the professional middle class — the people most sympathetic to dissidents like Aleksei Navalny — have gone into self-imposed exile. The remnants of a free press have been shuttered, probably for good. To the extent that Russia’s military has embarrassed itself, it is more likely to lead to a well-aimed purge from above than a broad revolution from below. Russia’s new energy riches could eventually help it shake loose the grip of sanctions.

This alternative analysis of Putin’s performance could be wrong. Then again, in war, politics and life, it’s always wiser to treat your adversary as a canny fox, not a crazy fool.

Muy interesante, gracias.

Tiendo a ver más próxima a la realidad esta visión que la que predomina en Occidente, que bajo mi punto de vista es demasiado triunfalista y simplista.

Solo el tiempo dirá qué analistas estaban más cerca de la realidad que surja de este conflicto.

    Totalmente de acuerdo.

clichentero escribió:Algunos lleváis que no os den la razón peor que Ferreras.

lacan escribió:

pantxo escribió:Tremenda entrevista a Rafael Poch, el mejor programa que han hecho hasta la fecha. Desgrana los intereses rusos, chinos, americanos y europeos, habla de la desaparicion en Ucrania de "disidentes". Las posibles salidas de Putin y Zelenski. Cuenta quien amenazó a este con colgarlo de un arbol...
No os haré spoiler.

Tanto como tremenda, me ha parecido una entrevista normal, una visión objetiva de los hechos lo que a día de hoy para algunos se traduce como pro ruso

En serio, yo lo que están haciendo la mayoría de  medios de comunicación con este asunto no lo había visto en la vida.

pantxo escribió:

Dumbie escribió:Quien saca el fusil para no usarlo es un bolchevique

https://twitter.com/MartinLthQueen/status/1508845224528949248?s=20&t=JsSSX2hLBz7UplzxhX8lMg

A esta gente les llegan las armas que mandamos desde Europa y USA. Cuando termine todo esto se va a quedar un continente precioso.

esquío escribió:

clichentero escribió:Algunos lleváis que no os den la razón peor que Ferreras.

Tal cual, y lo peor es que retuercen las cosas para situarte en una posición extrema de malo/malísimo por que no opinas como ellos, y lo más risible es que se les llena la boca con la palabra "democracia", claro claro...

lacan escribió:

pantxo escribió:Tremenda entrevista a Rafael Poch, el mejor programa que han hecho hasta la fecha. Desgrana los intereses rusos, chinos, americanos y europeos, habla de la desaparicion en Ucrania de "disidentes". Las posibles salidas de Putin y Zelenski. Cuenta quien amenazó a este con colgarlo de un arbol...
No os haré spoiler.

Tanto como tremenda, me ha parecido una entrevista normal, una visión objetiva de los hechos lo que a día de hoy para algunos se traduce como pro ruso

En serio, yo lo que están haciendo la mayoría de  medios de comunicación con este asunto no lo había visto en la vida.

terremoto73 escribió:en GARA viene hoy una entrevista interesante a Ruth Ferreiro,profesora y politologa experta en Rusia,dice que Rusia no cumple los requisitos de una democracia plena,que es un regimen autocratico con una justicia a su servicio,que no hay una oposición social relevante a Putin,que ve dificil que Rusia quiera hacerse con Odessa por todos los medios por el simbolismo que tiene para los rusos

Fridge escribió:

esquío escribió:

clichentero escribió:Algunos lleváis que no os den la razón peor que Ferreras.

Tal cual, y lo peor es que retuercen las cosas para situarte en una posición extrema de malo/malísimo por que no opinas como ellos, y lo más risible es que se les llena la boca con la palabra "democracia", claro claro...

Ostras, cómo has editado sin que aparezca el mensaje como editado?

Respecto al mensaje, que yo recuerde eres tú el que viene despreciando cualquier visión diferente a la tuya y empleando epítetos despectivos cada semana para todos los binarios que no compartan tu visión objetiva e ilustrada de los acontecimientos.

Zoetrope escribió:

lacan escribió:

pantxo escribió:Tremenda entrevista a Rafael Poch, el mejor programa que han hecho hasta la fecha. Desgrana los intereses rusos, chinos, americanos y europeos, habla de la desaparicion en Ucrania de "disidentes". Las posibles salidas de Putin y Zelenski. Cuenta quien amenazó a este con colgarlo de un arbol...
No os haré spoiler.

Tanto como tremenda, me ha parecido una entrevista normal, una visión objetiva de los hechos lo que a día de hoy para algunos se traduce como pro ruso

En serio, yo lo que están haciendo la mayoría de  medios de comunicación con este asunto no lo había visto en la vida.

Por lo que dices en el último párrafo, deduzco que estos dos últimos años los has pasado en un encierro en el Tibet.

terremoto73 escribió:en GARA viene hoy una entrevista interesante a Ruth Ferreiro,profesora y politologa experta en Rusia,dice que Rusia no cumple los requisitos de una democracia plena,que es un regimen autocratico con una justicia a su servicio,que no hay una oposición social relevante a Putin,que ve dificil que Rusia quiera hacerse con Odessa por todos los medios por el simbolismo que tiene para los rusos

Koikila escribió:

terremoto73 escribió:en GARA viene hoy una entrevista interesante a Ruth Ferreiro,profesora y politologa experta en Rusia,dice que Rusia no cumple los requisitos de una democracia plena,que es un regimen autocratico con una justicia a su servicio,que no hay una oposición social relevante a Putin,que ve dificil que Rusia quiera hacerse con Odessa por todos los medios por el simbolismo que tiene para los rusos

Plena, dice
Un tipo que puso bombas en edficios matando a su propia gente para luego presentarse como el que lo iba a arreglar todo

Koikila escribió:

terremoto73 escribió:en GARA viene hoy una entrevista interesante a Ruth Ferreiro,profesora y politologa experta en Rusia,dice que Rusia no cumple los requisitos de una democracia plena,que es un regimen autocratico con una justicia a su servicio,que no hay una oposición social relevante a Putin,que ve dificil que Rusia quiera hacerse con Odessa por todos los medios por el simbolismo que tiene para los rusos

Plena, dice
Un tipo que puso bombas en edficios matando a su propia gente para luego presentarse como el que lo iba a arreglar todo

terremoto73 escribió:

Koikila escribió:

terremoto73 escribió:en GARA viene hoy una entrevista interesante a Ruth Ferreiro,profesora y politologa experta en Rusia,dice que Rusia no cumple los requisitos de una democracia plena,que es un regimen autocratico con una justicia a su servicio,que no hay una oposición social relevante a Putin,que ve dificil que Rusia quiera hacerse con Odessa por todos los medios por el simbolismo que tiene para los rusos

Plena, dice
Un tipo que puso bombas en edficios matando a su propia gente para luego presentarse como el que lo iba a arreglar todo

la politologa es muy critica con Putin,pero que aquello no es Corea del Norte,ni la Argentina de Videla,en esta guerra que tenemos ahora los videos mas espeluzanantes que estan saliendo son sobretodo de un bando

terremoto73 escribió:

Koikila escribió:

terremoto73 escribió:en GARA viene hoy una entrevista interesante a Ruth Ferreiro,profesora y politologa experta en Rusia,dice que Rusia no cumple los requisitos de una democracia plena,que es un regimen autocratico con una justicia a su servicio,que no hay una oposición social relevante a Putin,que ve dificil que Rusia quiera hacerse con Odessa por todos los medios por el simbolismo que tiene para los rusos

Plena, dice
Un tipo que puso bombas en edficios matando a su propia gente para luego presentarse como el que lo iba a arreglar todo

la politologa es muy critica con Putin,pero que aquello no es Corea del Norte,ni la Argentina de Videla,en esta guerra que tenemos ahora los videos mas espeluzanantes que estan saliendo son sobretodo de un bando